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modalities as being-in-one’s-own-skin, the-one-for-the-other and having-the-other-under-one’s-own-
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Introduction
The question of flesh and body is not a 
central one for levinas’ philosophy. the 
ethical relation to both the epiphenomenal 
other and the ethical transformation of 
subjectivity stay remains a main concern 
in major works such as Time and the 
Other (1990), Totality and Infinity (2004), 
and Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
the Essence (2006). the intersubjective 
relation indeed presupposes different 
modalities of embodied subjectivity. 
However, the aspect of embodiment is 
enlightened only as a side issue and is 
not seen as a central concept in revealing 
the responsible subjectivity. although 
bringing eros into discussion, levinas 
does not really prioritize the formation of 
the sensible erotic body of subjectivity and 
of the embodied feminine. In Otherwise 
than Being, I find a fascinating exposition 
of how skin, touch, caress, and pain form 
integrative parts of subjectivity. I suggest 
that the face-to-face relation with the 
other introduces not just a new modality 
of responsible subjectivity, but a particular 
embodied experience which can be 
described as being-in-one’s-own-skin, the-
one-for-the-other, and having-the-other-
under-one’s-own-skin. I believe that these 
embodied states accentuate the conceptual 
work of maternity and the feminine in 
constructing ethical subjectivity. 
In the title of the paper I use the expres-
sion “unfolding flesh.” Levinas discusses 
the notion of the flesh in Otherwise than 
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Being, while analyzing the role of substi-
tution in ethical relation. In this paper, I 
take the flesh as the key notion which both 
forms the ethical response and modulates 
subjectivity. I will show how the flesh of 
subjectivity is constructed by touch, ca-
ress, and pain. The meaning of “unfold-
ing flesh” will be revealed on the follow-
ing levels: erotic love relation, welcome, 
and maternity. thus, my aim is to disclose 
the ethical body of subjectivity within the 
face-to-face situation, and to prove that the 
relation with the other questions and de-
constructs the body of subjectivity.  
The Embodied Face-to-Face  
Relation with the Other
the intersubjective face-to-face relation 
implies a practical experience of being-in-
the-world. this particular engagement has, 
first of all, an ethical meaning as being re-
sponsible and responsive to the other. One 
of the modalities of responsible subjectiv-
ity is conceptualized in erotic relation. In 
Time and the Other, levinas writes that 
“the exteriority of the other is not simply 
due to the space that separates what re-
mains identical through the concept, nor 
is it due to any difference that the concept 
would manifest through spatial exterior-
ity. the relationship with alterity is neither 
spatial nor conceptual” (Levinas 1990: 84). 
It is a relationship based on a specific form 
of sensibility which is grasped in love. 
Introducing erotic face-to-face rela-
tion with the other levinas elaborates on 
ethical responsibility as a particular form 
of embodiment and sensibility funded by a 
loving caress and touch. It is in the relation 
of love that subjectivity approaches the 
other in feeling the touch of its body and 
skin (Levinas 1996: 85). This is a unique 
situation, in which the other appears as an 
object of love (that is, an object of need), 
but at the same time remains totally other 
(Levinas 1990: 36). In love I am called to 
responsibility because the beloved one ap-
pears to me in all its fragility and weakness; 
in love I fear for the other. to put it dif-
ferently: for Levinas, to be beloved means 
an absolute exposure, nakedness and also 
helplessness (Levinas 2004: 255). In Eros, 
ethical subjectivity is formed as embodied 
sensibility which responds to the proxim-
ity of the other held by its openness and 
fragility in loving caress and touch. 
levinas emphasizes that this embodied 
sensibility and proximity are given through 
skin contact: “The expression “in one’s 
skin” is not simply a metaphor for the in 
itself. It relates to a recurrence in the dead 
time or the between-time separating inspira-
tion and expiration, the diastole and systole 
of the heart beating softly against the lining 
of one’s own skin. the body is not merely 
an image or a figure; above all, it is the in-
oneself and contraction of ipseity” (Levinas 
1996: 87). This being-in-one’s-skin initiates 
a proximity to the beloved one, but is also a 
fatigue of one’s own embodiment crystal-
lized in desire for the other. It is vulner-
ability and exposure to the other in a desire 
for love but, at the same time, it is a painful 
openness of skin contact with the other.
Precisely in the relation of love is ipseity 
tied to the incarnation. Being-in-one’s-skin 
places subjectivity in the state of a constant 
contraction of breathing and pulsation 
of heart beats because of the exposure to 
the beloved one. It is also an incredible 
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withdrawal of the self as going beyond 
the self in a desire for the other (levinas 
1996: 87). Yet, the erotic situation is, as 
Levinas puts it, “the equivocal par excel-
lence” (Levinas 2004: 255). This equivocal 
meaning is rooted in a double structure of 
desire (Ibid.: 258): it is a quest for satiety 
and, at the same time, it is an eternal quest 
for something which can never be mine or 
a part of me – the future. In love I search 
for something which has not yet become, 
something which is always in the future and 
escapes my intention: “This not knowing,” 
this fundamental disorder, is the essential. 
It is like a game with something slipping 
away, a game absolutely without project or 
plan, not with what can become ours or us, 
but with something, always other, always 
inaccessible, and always to come” (Levinas 
1990: 89). For Levinas, the originality of 
eros consists precisely in the impossibil-
ity of returning to the ego; eros becomes 
a manifestation of a pure relation with the 
other in which the other and subjectivity 
can never form a union (Levinas 2004: 
257–259).
In this context, the skin touch is neither 
a passive surface of intersubjective com-
munication nor a biological one. It is not 
only a condition of relation to the object 
but, being in its nature erotic, serves as 
grounds for ethical relation. Being in one’s 
skin is a pre-conceptual and pre-reflexive 
state of the subjectivity. levinas argues 
that “the ego in itself like one is in one’s 
skin, that is to say, cramped, ill at ease in 
one’s skin, as though the identity of matter 
weighing on itself concealed a dimension 
allowing a withdrawal this side of immedi-
ate coincidence” (Levinas 1996: 86). To 
escape this coincidence with its ipseity, the 
subjectivity has to move from the modality 
“being-in-one’s-skin” to “having-the-other-
under-one’s-skin”1. “Having-the-other-un-
der-one’s-skin” conditions the constitution 
of ethical embodiment, which precisely 
leads to the non-coincidence with oneself 
within the lived and sensible body in erotic 
relation. 
the main reason why levinas introduc-
es the concept of embodiment into face-to-
face relation with the other is, as Critchley 
observes, “to ‘ground’ ethical subjectivity 
in sensibility and to describe sensibility as 
proximity to the other, a proximity whose 
basis is found in substitution” (Critchley 
1992: 179). Levinas’ intention is to “disen-
gage the subjectivity of the subject from the 
reflections on truth, time and being in the 
amphibology of being and entities which 
is borne by the said; it will then present the 
subject, in saying, as sensibility from the 
first animated by responsibilities” (Levinas 
2006: 19). This strategy allows him to give 
special attention to the questions of eros, 
love, and sexuality. ethical experience is, 
thus, located not in a consciousness, but in 
embodiment and in the flesh exposed to the 
other. For levinas, the initial displacement 
of the intentional consciousness is rooted in 
the body itself “in the form of corporeality, 
whose movements are fatigue and whose 
duration is ageing i.e., the passivity of signi-
1  Levinas does not explicitly use “having-the-
other-under-one’s-skin”, however, in Otherwise than 
Being he describes a traumatic experience of embodied 
subjectivity being marked by and exposed to the other 
as turned inside out and as having the other on the other 
side of the skin (Levinas 2006: 48-51). Therefore in this 
paper I decided to introduce a modality of “having-the-
other-under-one’s-skin” to conceptualize the work of 
affection. 
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fication, of the one-for-another is not an act, 
but patience, that is, of itself sensibility or 
imminence of pain” (Levinas 2006: 55).
levinas seizes upon corporeality only 
as ethical one: it is giving oneself to the 
other. However, this statement needs a 
detailed explanation of how the corporeal-
ity and ethical embodied response to the 
other are formed, and what is the role of 
“being-in-one’s-skin” to “having-the-other 
–under-one’s-skin.” To reach this goal I will 
take the following steps. First, I examine 
the feminine in the face-to-face situation 
and the connection between the feminine 
and “being-in-one’s-skin,” with a focus on 
caress, touch and vulnerability. Second, I 
analyze being-in-one’s-skin as a manifesta-
tion of welcome. then I will gradually move 
to a discussion of “having-the-other-under- 
one’s-skin” in the form of maternity.
Erotic Embodiment: The Feminine
the subject cannot go beyond the power 
of knowledge while it remains within it-
self. Levinas tends to find a transcendence 
that lies in maintaining the integrity of the 
self while allowing being-in-one’s-skin to 
surpass itself. For levinas, the decision 
is rooted in the erotic relation: in love the 
subject can fulfill all these conditions2. the 
2  Of course, the argument is about the question of 
whether erotic relation can be subsumed under the soci-
al relation. also, Freud’s concept of the erotic relation 
is worth discussing in this context: Levinas claims that 
Freud’s misunderstanding lies in his attempt to perceive 
that sexuality starts with the self but not with the Other. 
Levinas writes: “The categories of separated sexuality, 
of psychology and biology where they have been lodged 
until now are the categories of a pluralistic ontology, 
of a plurality which does not merely count being, but 
which constitutes it as event. the elaboration of these 
categories irreducible to those of light appear to us a 
philosophy of transcendence” (Levinas 1949).
encounter with the feminine is qualified as 
a relation with alterity which is akin to the 
alterity of the ethical relation. thus, the 
feminine is a privileged term for levinas. 
First, it is a central concept in erotic rela-
tion. Second, introducing the feminine, he 
claims a priority of alterity over the one. 
the idea that alterity can be accomplished 
in the feminine amounts already to a radical 
philosophical claim: “the place of Eros al-
lows us to see that the other par excellence 
is the feminine” (Levinas 1978: 85). The 
erotic relation implies already the feminine 
as a structural component. 
the otherness of the feminine catalyzes 
the desire for the beloved one and the desire 
to touch and to be touched. the embodied 
self is provoked and questioned by the nu-
dity of the feminine in the erotic situation. 
the sensory experience of the touch befalls 
the subject before any conceptualization. 
Irigaray describes this experience as fol-
lows: 
touch makes it possible to wait, to gather 
strength, so that the other will return to caress 
to reshape, from within and from without, 
flesh that is given back to itself in the gestures 
of love. the most subtly necessary guardian 
of my life being the other’s flesh. Approa-
ching and speaking to me with his hands. 
Bringing me back to life more intimately than 
any regenerative nourishment, the other’s 
hands, these palms with which he approaches 
without going through me, give me back the 
borders of my body and call me back to the 
remembrance of the most profound intimacy. 
as he caresses me, he bids me neither to di-
sappear nor to forget but rather to remember 
the place where, for me, the most intimate 
life holds itself in reserve. Searching for what 
has not yet come into being, for himself, he 
invites me to become what I have not yet 
become. (Irigaray 1986: 232–233)
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In Irigaray’s interpretation, the other-
ness of the feminine shapes the modal-
ity of being-in-one’s-skin because of inti-
mate moment of making love as flesh to 
flesh. However, the feminine also moves 
the subjectivity towards having the other-
under-one’s-skin, as love presupposes the 
unsatisfied search for the body of the be-
loved one, its openness and vulnerability, 
its appeal and voluptuosity. 
Irigaray shows how, in this most inti-
mate relation with the other, the feminine 
gives itself as welcoming embodiment and 
as being-for-the-other:
the gaze still innocent of the limits of reason, 
the division of day and night, the alteration 
of the seasons, animal cruelty, the necessity 
of protecting oneself from the other or from 
God. Face to face encounter of two naked lo-
vers in a nudity that is older than, and unlike, 
a sacrilege. Not perceivable as profanation. 
the threshold of the garden, a welcoming 
cosmic home, that remains open. No guard 
other than that of love itself. (Irigaray 1986: 
243–244)
the touch constructs the body of sub-
jectivity by tracing the surface of sensi-
tive experience. However, for levinas, the 
touch in erotic situation is not an ethical 
one, and has a cognitive structure: it is a 
search for the alterity of feminine embodi-
ment. From the start levinas is concerned 
with an ethical embodiment in which the 
erotic relation is the supreme manifesta-
tion of alterity. according to levinas, eros 
has a double structure: “Love remains a 
relation with the other that turns into need, 
and this need still presupposes the total, 
transcendent exteriority of the other, of the 
beloved. But love also goes beyond the be-
loved” (Levinas 2004: 254). Eros involves 
a return to itself: in love I do not only love 
the other, but I also return to myself, I love 
myself, and I am also touched. It presup-
poses transcendence, but it also collapses 
into the enjoyment of being touched. the 
erotic relation is less radical than the ethi-
cal relation of the face-to-face.
There is a sort of egoism found in love: 
“If to love is to love the love that the Be-
loved bears on me, to love is also to love 
oneself in love, and thus to return to oneself. 
Love does not transcend unequivocally ─ 
it is complacent, it is pleasure and dual 
egoism” (Ibid.: 266). Indeed, in love I can 
transcend myself, but in love I also enjoy 
myself and enjoy my own flesh. Levinas 
insists that love bears both immanence and 
transcendence, it is “situated at the limit of 
immanence and transcendence… as though 
the too great audacity of the loving tran-
scendence were paid for by a throw-back 
this side of need” (Ibid.: 254). 
Levinas’ idea, then, is to find a tran-
scendence that lies in maintaining the in-
tegrity of the embodied self while allowing 
the self to surpass itself. the subject cannot 
go beyond the power of knowledge while it 
remains within itself. For levinas, the deci-
sion is rooted in the erotic relation. In love 
the subject can fulfill all these conditions. 
However, the feminine, being tender-
ness and beauty, again kindles the desire 
for enjoyment. For Irigaray, the feminine 
resists and attracts this desire. In levinas’ 
description of the feminine I find an interest-
ing explanation: 
…a play with something elusive, a play abso-
lutely without aim or plan not with that which 
may become ours and our self, but with so-
mething other, always inaccessible, always in 
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the future. the caress is the anticipation of the 
pure becoming, without content. It is made up 
of this intensified hunger, of promises ever 
richer, opening new perspectives onto the 
ungraspable. It is nourishing by innumerable 
hungers. (Levinas 1990: 89)
this statement becomes decisive for 
Irigaray. She claims that the caress does not 
mean the approach to the other in its more 
vivid appearance, i.e., in erotic feeling, but 
that it is a reduction of the other and of the 
erotic event which becomes apparent in the 
approach to the other’s body (Irigaray 1991: 
110). thus, according to Irigaray, the caress 
reduces the function of the feminine body 
to the satisfaction of the subject which pro-
duces the desire and hunger for flesh contact 
(Ibid.: 110–111). She writes: 
to caress, for levinas, consists, therefore, 
not in approaching the other in its most vital 
dimension, the touch, but in the reduction 
of that vital dimension of the other’s body 
to the elaboration of a future for himself. 
to caress could thus constitute the hidden 
intention of philosophical temporality. (Ibid.: 
1991: 110)
the body of the other serves as a rela-
tion with the future which belongs to the 
subjectivity itself. In other words, the sub-
jectivity gains its embodied future horizon 
in lovemaking thanks to the other.
For Irigaray, the masculine subject uses 
the feminine for its own intentionality in 
becoming an embodied subject; an acquisi-
tion of one’s own body (Ibid.: 111). Thus, 
according to Irigaray, erotic embodiment 
leads us back to the intentionality of subjec-
tivity and to the reduction of the feminine. 
In love the masculine subject transforms the 
body of the other, or the feminine body into 
its own embodiment. 
as a response to Irigaray’s critique, I 
shall accentuate levinas’ concept of the 
feminine. the feminine is presented as an 
ideal figure of alterity, manifesting a form 
of difference that “is in no way affected 
by the relation that can be established be-
tween it and its correlative”; it is a relation 
that “permits its term to remain absolutely 
other” (Levinas 1990: 85). This means that 
the feminine is not defined in terms of an 
opposition to the masculine, and because it 
is a pure alterity, it presupposes a different 
kind of relation which cannot be disclosed 
in terms of the masculine and feminine. 
levinas’ description of the feminine 
indicates an important structural feature 
that makes a clear distinction between 
the transcendence of the erotic relation 
and the transcendence that intentionality 
of consciousness implies. levinas claims 
that the feminine is “on the same level as, 
but in meaning opposed to, consciousness” 
(Ibid.: 88). But the feminine inverts the 
structure of intentionality: it is not a move-
ment towards, but a withdrawal. levinas 
writes: “The transcendence of the feminine 
consists in withdrawing elsewhere, which 
is a movement opposed to the movement of 
consciousness” (Ibid.: 88).
I suggest that this withdrawing necessar-
ily includes the work of the caress in love. In 
the erotic relation, the caress tends towards 
something with which the lover can never 
coincide, something which always escapes 
intention. The caress signifies a moment that 
cannot be accommodated by language, and 
as levinas notices, the object of the caress 
has not come into being (Levinas 2004: 
257). the caress searches for something 
which is beyond the future and beyond the 
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possibility of being grasped. I accentuate 
that in love relation, the caress is described 
as an ethical gesture. 
levinas writes that the caress expresses 
“love, but suffers from an inability to tell 
it. It is hungry for this very expression, in 
an unremitting increase of hunger. It thus 
goes further than to its end, it aims beyond 
an existent however future, which, precisely 
as an existent, knocks already at the gates of 
being” (Levinas 2004: 258). Levinas calls 
it sensibility, that which is expressed most 
often by the gesture and by the corporeal 
enjoyment in eros, but it is also that which 
resists being captured in concepts. It is 
not a manifestation of any free will, but is 
exactly a moment of being affected by the 
embodied feminine. 
I should add that the caress and sen-
sibility are distinguished from the notion 
of the sensation of touch. levinas argues 
that if the caress belongs to the sphere of 
sensation, then it would be included in the 
structure of intentional consciousness: the 
beloved one would be grasped by touch, 
and that “what is caressed is not touched, 
properly speaking” (Levinas 1990: 89). 
the caress indicates a different structure 
of intention: the caress is seeking and, in 
this sense, places itself on the same level 
as consciousness, but this seeking gesture 
is not terminated in an object. the essence 
of the caress is “constituted by the fact that 
the caress does not know what it seeks. this 
‘not knowing,’ this fundamental disorder, is 
the essential” (Ibid.). Despite the fact that 
the erotic relation imitates the intentional 
act, it inverts and breaks the structure of 
intentionality. Levinas remarks that “the 
relation with the other can be sought as an 
irreducible intentionality, even if one must 
end by seeing that it ruptures intentionality” 
(Levinas 1985: 32). To continue Levinas’ 
idea, I would add that the caress opens up 
and, at the same time, preserves the vulner-
ability of the beloved one, while the touch 
searches for, or, in other words, studies the 
alterity of, the embodied other.  
With this understanding of the caress, 
the beloved other can never be fully grasped 
within the horizon of my erotic touch, but 
remains the not-yet, always a mere pos-
sibility for my existence. this aspect is 
systematically marked as the feminine in 
levinas’ texts. For the beloved to be assimi-
lated totally into the horizon of my being, to 
become a possibility for the subject’s self-
recognition, would be to lose the essence of 
the face (body) entirely, to utterly profane 
the other in a light that exposes its nudity 
while obliterating its gaze.
thus, beyond the intentionality of eros, 
escaping the touch, there is still a face, the 
superior other, withdrawing before the 
heavy-handed approach of the lover, permit-
ting and welcoming his advances but still 
maintaining herself in alterity. this has not 
yet become fecundity, for the child is not 
anticipated in the caress – love does not is-
sue (Levinas 2004: 261). Nor have we really 
gone beyond the movement of the caress 
toward the Beloved yet, or examined what 
lies behind the movement of the caress. 
For what levinas truly demonstrates is that 
love is a double structure of voluptuosity, 
an accidental yet happy return to being-in-
one’s-own-skin that involves both lovers as 
lovers, and demonstrates the truth of both 
of their embodied desires. 
However, the modality of “being-in-
one’s-own-skin” is not fully ethical. It 
discloses the embodied subjectivity in its 
145
vulnerability and openness but it does not 
generate an ethical response to the other. 
the embodied subjectivity is an exposed 
flesh which is marked and structured by 
the caress and touch of the beloved one, 
but the relation to the other is regulated by 
the desire and the enjoyment of one’s own 
enjoyment and by the contact with one’s 
own skin. 
Embodiment as Welcome
levinas introduces the feminine as a sensi-
ble embodiment which is seen in modesty 
and welcome. I believe that femininity and 
modesty are not essential traits of the ex-
istent woman; femininity is loved in and 
through the love of the beloved’s love. the 
feminine does not define modesty, but rather 
modesty and withdrawal indicate the pres-
ence of the feminine, for the delight in the 
other’s voluptuosity is at the same time the 
delight in my own femininity – femininity 
is present in the modesty of the subject, in 
my original face-to-face presence with the 
other (Levinas 2004: 257–258).
It is precisely due to this egoism of 
being as separateness, however, that I am 
able to welcome the other who disturbs my 
enjoyment of my own embodiment. the 
appearance of the face of the other in its 
need, and the possibility of its death and 
disappearance, tells me that is not violent, 
but awakens responsibility in me which 
manifests as concern for the other. “By 
virtue of its intentional structure, gentle-
ness comes to the separated being from the 
other” (Ibid.: 150). This call compels me to 
open my dwelling to the other; specifically 
to offer my recollection and representation 
to the other (Ibid.: 154). The dwelling that I 
offer is the egoism of my enjoyment trans-
formed into a stable habitation as an attempt 
to defer the uncertainty of the future and 
the possibility of death and unfulfilled need 
(Ibid.: 155). This offering takes the form of 
my apology to the other as well – language, 
representation, and dwelling are intimately 
connected. 
levinas also stresses that the gesture 
of hospitability can be seen as a gesture of 
giving one’s own body’s enjoyment to the 
other. He writes:
In corporeality are united the traits we have 
enumerated: for the other, despite oneself, 
starting with oneself, the pain of labor in 
the patience of ageing, in the duty to give 
even bread out of one’s own mouth and the 
coat from one’s shoulders. as a passivity in 
the paining of the pain felt, sensibility is a 
vulnerability, for pain comes to interrupt an 
enjoyment in its very isolation, and thus tears 
me from myself. (Levinas 2006: 55)
the subjectivity is thrown back to it-
self or to being-in-one’s skin in being 
called for responsibility. For the subject, 
this also means to answer in the place of 
another, i.e., to substitute. thus, levinas 
moves from an analysis of being-in-one’s-
own-skin to the-one-for-the-other. there is 
a double structure of subjectivity: the sub-
jectivity is awakened by the other, but is 
also deposed by the other, because it is put 
in the place of another. It is wounded by 
the other’s appeal and converted into for-
the-other. the subjectivity is singularized 
as the-one-for-the-other and it becomes 
unique in its pain and vulnerability. 
thus, beginning from a phenomenology of 
enjoyment in Totality and Infinity, levinas 
moves to ethical embodiment as fractured 
and exposed in its nakedness, because, as he 
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writes: Pain penetrates into the very heart of 
the for-oneself that beats in enjoyment, in the 
life that is complacent in itself, that lives of 
its life. to give, to-be-for-the-another, despite 
oneself, but in interrupting the for-oneself, 
is to take the bread out of one’s mouth, to 
nourish the hunger of another with one’s own 
fasting. (Levinas 2006: 56)
Here, the pain is a load of one’s being 
and a heavy weight of being bounded to 
the ethical response; the impossibility of 
escaping the other. I would suggest this is 
an ethical but, at the same time, a physical 
pain of the flesh; it is an embodied substitu-
tion for the other.
recollection, as it constitutes my dwell-
ing, is already a distraction from both im-
mediate enjoyment and a concern for the 
well-being of the one for whom the possibil-
ity of death and needfulness are recognized 
(Levinas 2004: 155). It is through this struc-
ture of recollection in the dwelling that the 
other is welcomed. as I see the other in his 
poverty and need, I recognize the absolute 
alterity present in the possibility of his death 
and the urgency of his need. In order to do 
so, my own recollected bodily enjoyment 
must be displaced – withdrawn in modesty 
in order to offer the other a welcome. this 
structure of recollection and welcome is 
here also deemed the feminine (Ibid.), the 
source of gentleness in itself, and as being of 
my own gentleness as a separated being. 
the feminine is present in the separated 
ego from the very beginning. It is in fact 
an inherent part of the ego individuated 
in enjoyment. In a section of Totality and 
Infinity, “Habitation and Feminine,” the 
feminine is a component which makes the 
world ‘habitable’ and a kind of enjoyable 
embodiment of being-in-the-world. levinas 
suggests that the world becomes habitable 
because the feminine creates a refuge in 
it. He equates the feminine with a certain 
intimacy, and argues that the subject does 
not accrue the world or master it, but that the 
world appears with the feminine: “the other 
whose presence is discreetly in absence, 
with which is accomplished the primary 
hospitable welcome is the condition for rec-
ollection, the interiority of the Home, and 
inhabitation” (Ibid.: 155). Thus, the femi-
nine is a condition of the ethical because 
while being inherent part of subjectivity it 
opens it towards the other by welcoming 
and being hospitable. 
love shows two layers of the feminine. 
Pure voluptuosity exists as the attempt to go 
beyond the face to lose itself in hunger and 
in need of a skin contact, of the other’s body. 
When, in love, I “renounce myself by my-
self,” without violence, I in fact renounce 
my own femininity as it consists in my apol-
ogy that is offered through language, the 
representation of my enjoyment. However, 
modesty itself is not abolished, the face is 
not surpassed. rather, it is inverted in the 
structure of love, which is what constitutes it 
as the inverse of signification. Insofar as the 
feminine is the welcoming of another into 
my representation, my offering of language 
and dwelling to the other, the inversion of 
that structure – my hunger for the other’s 
welcome – is an abolishment of my good-
ness that is paradoxically only justified by 
its own abolishment, since modesty and 
welcome are still presupposed. this is the 
very concern manifested before the fragility 
of the other, the concern with maintaining 
myself in my goodness, as the love of the 
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other’s love for my goodness, alongside my 
pure desire and hunger.
Levinas states:
In order that this future arises in its significa-
tion as a postponement and a delay in which 
labour, by mastering the uncertainty of the 
future and its insecurity and by establishing 
possession, delineates separation in the form 
of economic independence, the separated 
being must be able to recollect itself and have 
representations. recollection and representa-
tion are produced concretely as habitation in a 
dwelling or a Home. (Levinas 2004: 150)
Here I read the feminine as a formation 
and condition of an ethical body – it is a 
response to the other “I am here.” The idea 
of home, and of its intimacy, is guaranteed 
by our hospitality which is caused by the 
presence of gentleness and kindness issu-
ing from the feminine. It is precisely the 
encounter with the feminine that makes the 
subject hospitable (Levinas 2006: 77; Levi-
nas 2004: 261). It should be noted that Levi-
nas does not intend to show the feminine as 
a biological phenomenon characterized by 
natural softness and kindness. rather, he is 
articulating that the feminine characterizes 
the intersubjective relation. according to 
levinas, the feminine is already evident in 
the “first revelation of the other” (Levinas 
2004: 258). It tears the solitude of isolated 
subjectivity and, at the same time, prevents 
a return of the subject to itself (Ibid.: 265). 
In other words, after having experienced 
the openness, hospitability, and tenderness 
in the face of the other, there is no reason 
for subjectivity to turn back to the solitude 
of existence. thus, the feminine opens a 
horizon of the future for the isolated subject 
(Ibid.: 259–260).
It should be noted that the appearance 
of the beloved is different from the appear-
ance of the face, because it is, first of all, 
an embodied appearance. It is no longer a 
trace of the beloved but a pure bodily pres-
ence in erotic vulnerability, tenderness and 
fragility (Ibid.: 264). It is also an open flesh 
of subjectivity which is exposed towards the 
beloved one. the tender is different from 
the physical body and the expressive body 
of the other3. Since the beloved is someone 
having a face, the exhibition of its face is al-
ways a sort of profanation. It is evident that 
to love means to be concerned for the vul-
nerability of the other, but it also indicates 
participation in its mystery that is brought 
into light in the erotic relation (Ibid.: 257). 
But this mystery can never be disclosed, 
since the beloved cannot be grasped and 
because the lover searches for this endless. 
this eternal search in love points to the ‘not 
yet’ that cannot be projected or achieved. 
thus, love is thought to be a search for the 
infinite in the future. But, in the future I also 
search for a grasping and holding of my own 
embodiment, which can be interpreted as 
a return to the same, or, in other words, a 
return to being-in-one’s-own-skin. 
3  It is neither corps propre described in Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception as an incarnation 
of ‘I can.’ taking the study of perception as his point 
of departure, Merleau-Ponty was led to recognize that 
one’s own body (le corps propre) is not only a thing, a 
potential object of study for science, but is also a perma-
nent condition of experience, a constituent of the per-
ceptual openness to the world and to its investment. He 
therefore underlines the fact that there is an inherence 
of consciousness and of the body of which the analysis 
of perception should take account. the primacy of per-
ception signifies a primacy of experience, so to speak, 
in so far as perception becomes an active and consti-
tutive dimension. the development of his works thus 
establishes an analysis which recognizes corporeality of 
consciousness as much as intentionality of the body.
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levinas intends to establish a relation 
with the future which escapes a bodily rep-
etition. In loving the other’s love, the future 
beyond all possibilities and all expectations 
announces itself. according to levinas, this 
love and search for the future logically is-
sues in a child (Levinas 2004: 268–269). 
Nevertheless, this feminine other re-
vealed in the face is, as levinas suggests, 
also a woman: “and the other whose pres-
ence is discreetly an absence, with which 
is accomplished the primary hospitable 
welcome which describes the field of in-
timacy, is the Woman. the woman is the 
condition for recollection, the interiority of 
the Home, and inhabitation” (Ibid.: 171). 
as soon as we switch from the feminine 
in the face-to-face relation to the woman, 
the status of woman as the other changes 
slightly. Woman turns out to be a condition 
of the ethical relation, since in her vulner-
ability, exposure, and hospitability she puts 
an end to any possibility of exteriorization 
and possession4. Levinas affirms that “in 
order that I am able to free myself from the 
very possession that the welcome of the 
Home established, in order that I be able to 
see things in themselves, that is, represent 
them to myself, refuse both enjoyment and 
possession, I must know how to give what 
I possess… But for this I must encounter 
the indiscreet face of the other that calls 
me into question” (Ibid.: 170). It is evident 
that while the woman and the erotic relation 
4  the theme of the woman as a condition of ethical 
relation deserves a separate discussion. However, in the 
context of this paper I just note that levinas refers to 
the story of rebecca who could anticipate the needs of 
Abraham’s servants: she had offered water before they 
had asked. thus, the image of a woman and a gesture of 
the woman’s body condition ethical response.
ground and cause the ethical relation, the 
woman herself is not in full measure a part 
of the intersubjective relation. However, 
I suggest that levinas indeed considers a 
woman’s body as a gesture of giving one’s 
self and as being a refuge for the other. 
thus, levinas connects the sensibility of 
the feminine with the home which is thought 
to be a bodily hospitability. as a result, the 
feminine substitutes its erotic sensitivity for 
the ethical bodily welcome.
Ethical Body as Flesh Made Word
In order to become ethical embodiment, 
subjectivity has to move from erotic love to 
the birth of the child, whose being derives 
from the union of the loving pair. From the 
erotic experience of skin contact, subjectiv-
ity is transformed into ‘having-the-other-
under-one’s-skin.’ the erotic relation cannot 
be accomplished within itself. according 
to levinas, it results in the birth of a child 
and in responsibility for the child. thus, 
erotic embodiment has necessarily to be 
transformed into ethical embodiment, where 
the feminine is no longer nakedness and 
openness but, on the contrary, is reshaped 
into the-other-in-the-same. 
In Otherwise that Being, this idea of 
proximity to the beloved other is revealed 
as maternity, which is also skin and flesh 
contact. Subjectivity as one-for-the-other 
is borne in maternity, meaning a deposing 
of itself, a deposing which, according to 
levinas, is the very possibility of giving. 
this giving could be described as a gift of 
my body, my food and clothes to the other 
before I have been born as a sensible sub-
ject, even before my free will, and without 
the possibility of being together, since the 
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other has already marked me inside. as 
Levinas writes:
sensible experience as an obsession by the 
other, or a maternity, is already corporeality. 
The corporeality of one’s own body signifies, 
as sensibility itself, a knot or a denouement of 
being. … one-for-the-other, which signifies 
in giving, when giving offers not the superf-
luxion of the superfluous, but the bread taken 
from one’s mouth. Signification signifies, 
consequently, in nourishing, clothing, lod-
ging, in maternal relation, in which matter 
shows itself for the first time in its materiality. 
(Levinas 2006: 77)
Subjectivity loses the for-oneself and 
leaves space for the ethical language by 
becoming the ethical body. It is the car-
rying of responsibility, vulnerability and 
suffering that is pre-natal, not only in a 
biological sense but also in an ethical one, 
where the ethical is prior to the physical: 
“the subjectivity of sensibility, taken as 
incarnation, is an abandon without return, 
maternity, a body suffering for another, 
the body as passivity and renouncement, a 
pure undergoing” (Levinas 2006: 79). 
levinas does not speak only about the 
biological body which gives itself: “the 
concept of incarnate subject is not a bio-
logical concept. the schema that corpore-
ality outlines submits the biological itself 
to a higher structure” (Ibid.: 109). Thus, 
he attempts to formulate a concept of an 
ethical language grasped in embodiment 
and sensibility. the embodied sensibility 
of maternity represents the saying which is 
beyond the simple answer “I am here.” It is 
pre-reflective sensibility characterized by 
touch rather than by speech or by vision. 
Levinas writes: “In starting with touching, 
interpreted not as palpation but as contact, 
we have tried to describe proximity as irre-
ducible to consciousness” (Ibid.: 80). It is 
an archaic and passionate giving of one’s 
flesh as an ethical response to the other and 
for the other. In the maternal, the saying 
questions not only the spontaneity of erotic 
embodiment but also reveals the depth of 
being exposed to the other in one’s own 
skin and in one’s own broken flesh. There 
is no return to erotic embodiment, because 
prior to the enjoyment of the erotic caress, 
the subject finds itself in eternal flesh sub-
stitution for the other.  
the ethical embodiment of maternity 
reveals the mother-child relation, which is 
different from the father-child relation. In 
the father-child relation, subjectivity both 
remains itself and becomes other than it-
self: “Paternity is the relationship with a 
stranger who, entirely while being other, 
is myself, the relationship of the ego with 
a myself who is nonetheless a stranger to 
me” (Levinas 1990: 91). Yet, in the mother-
child relation the child belongs to the sub-
stance of the mother and it is of the moth-
er5. there is a sharing of substance that 
finally leads to total substitution: in feed-
ing, the mother gives herself to the child. 
It is one-for-the-other without keeping the 
same. In this sense, the ethical body of the 
father always has a possibility to move to 
the modality of erotic embodiment of the 
one-for-the-other. However, the ethical 
embodiment of maternity presupposes a 
total disruption of the erotic embodiment, 
because the other has torn the essence of 
the erotic flesh; the other is of the mother’s 
flesh, where the subject already substitutes 
the other in all possible places. 
5  this theme has received a detailed explanation in 
Standford 2001.
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Maternal ethical embodiment be-
comes appropriate for the signifying of 
the sense – “bearing par excellence” 
(Levinas 2006: 75). Here I find a remark-
able change in the reading of the femi-
nine – it is revealed as the signifying, par 
excellence, of alterity, of subjectivity and 
of the saying. Describing the feminine as 
the-other-in-the-same, levinas discovers 
the ethical saying in the core of the said:
But the saying extended toward the said recei-
ved this tension from the other, who forces me 
to speak before appearing to me. the saying 
extended towards the said is a being obsessed 
by the other, a sensibility which the other by 
vocation calls upon and where no escaping 
is possible. (Levinas 2006: 77)
Before the other appeals to me, I am 
already forced to answer, because in ma-
ternity, subjectivity is disclosed as being 
obsessed by the other and being a hostage 
of the other. 
Giving, welcoming and deposing one-
self are linked to the saying within the 
said. let me also add that maternity as 
subjectivity in absolute exposedness to the 
other (to the child) is described by levi-
nas as speaking (Ibid.: 92). It is a form of 
an ethical language, the essence of which 
consists in being silent and offering that 
silence as a gift for the other and as be-
ing-for-the-other. this silent speaking is a 
fundamental passivity that again indicates 
a non-intentional state of consciousness: 
“this passivity is the way opposed to the 
imperialism of consciousness open to the 
world” (Ibid.: 92). 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes: 
“The other who welcomes in intimacy 
is not the you [vous] of the face that re-
veals itself in a dimension of height, but 
precisely the thou [tu] of familiarity: lan-
guage without teaching, a silent language, 
an understanding without words, an ex-
pression in secret” (Levinas 2004: 155). 
Indeed, as I discussed earlier, the welcom-
ing revealed as the ethical of the feminine 
escapes thematization and phenomenality. 
In his analysis of welcome and ethical lan-
guage, Derrida specifies that “the welcome 
orients, it turns the topos of an opening 
of the door and of the threshold towards 
the other; it offers it to the other as other, 
where the as such of the other slips away 
from phenomenality, and, even more so, 
from thematicity” (Derrida 1999: 54). The 
passage suggests that “offering to the other 
as other” is the offering of the saying, pre-
cisely the feminine as hospitability read in 
the context of language. the essence of the 
ethical language consists in welcoming the 
other, but this welcoming is not just a situ-
ation in which I find myself obliged, but 
one in which I could speak for the other.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would add that in discussing 
the meaning of erotic and ethical embodi-
ments, levinas also attempts to overcome 
the opposition of body and language. He 
elaborates a complicated inversion of the 
body into language and vice versa. the 
incarnation of the language in sensible 
embodiment is a linguistic constitution of 
the bodily self but, at the same, is a negation 
of the linguistic pronoun “I” and its active 
agency in flesh experience in modalities 
of the one-for-the-other and the other-in-
the-same.  
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In this paper, I have suggested that 
embodiment has a crucial ethical signifi-
cance in levinas’ philosophical corporal 
schemata. The concept of the flesh has a 
reversible character owing to the modalities 
of being-in-one’s-own-skin and having-
the-other-under-one’s-own-skin. It means 
that embodied contact with the other in the 
face-to-face relation is both inward – feel-
ing one’s own vulnerable surface and pain, 
and, outward – giving one’s own body to the 
other. the discussed modalities of embodied 
subjectivity reveal an ethical experience of 
unconditioned responsibility: subjectivity 
is formed as the one-for-the-other in erotic 
love relation through caress and welcome, 
while maternity and the feminine concep-
tualize corporeality as absolute giving of 
one’s own body and substitution for the 
other in having-the-other-under-the-skin. 
this brings us to the discussion of a new 
embodied identity, i.e. identity as flesh un-
folding towards the other first deconstructed 
and then again restored in the face-to-face 
relation. the originality of levinas’ philoso-
phy of corporeality consists in discussing 
responsible subjectivity in such terms as the 
caress, skin touch, being-in-one’s-own-skin 
and having-the-other-under-one’s-own-
skin. thus, I shall conclude that sensibility 
and ethical responsibility are indeed insepa-
rable: the ethical response finds itself in the 
form of intersubjective and incorporated 
sensibility. 
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Dėmesys skiriamas tokiems egzistenciniams modalumams kaip „buvimas savo paties odoje“, „vienas kitam“, 
„kito buvimas po mano oda“. Motinystės ir moteriškumo konceptualinis veikimas akistatos situacijoje išryškina 
reikšmę atsakančio ir atsakingo juslumo, kurį Levinas atskleidžia savo pagrindiniuose darbuose „Kitaip negu 
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